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dual, d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP, a 
Utah corporation; and TERRY 
PENTELAKIS, an individual, 
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JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT 
D. BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP; THE 
PAWN SHOP, a Utah corpor-
ation; JAMES ANDERSON, an 
individual d/b/a JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PENTELAKIS, an indivi-
dual, d/b/a AAA JEWELERS; 
and LOANS AND SALES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 880292-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Defendants/Appellants Ellen K. Daskalas, individually 
and d/b/a The Pawn Shop, Terry Pentelakis, individually and d/b/a 
AAA Jewelers & Loans, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Brant H. Wall and Jerome H. Mooney, III, hereby petition the Court 
for a rehearing with reference to the Opinion of the Court filed on 
October 11, 1989, as to issues II and IV, and the related issues 
pertaining to the tenants leasehold interests and attorney's fees. 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY THE 
PREVAILING LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE "DATE OF TAKING". 
It is necessary to orderly proceedings in condemnation that 
a date be fixed for determining the value of the estates to be 
taken during the proceeding. 78-34-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, establishes that date as "the date of the service of 
summons. . ." and specifically provides: 
"For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the 
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date 
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of the service of summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property 
not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases 
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the next 
preceding section [§ 78-34-10]. No improvements put upon 
the property subsequent to the date of service of summons 
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. " (Emphasis added.) 
In construing this statute, the Utah Supreme Court, in a 
long series of cases, has consistently and repeatedly held that the 
date of taking and the value of damages should be measured as of 
the time of the service of summons. See: State v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, 78 P2d 502 at 506; Hyde Park Town v. 
Chambers, 104 P2d 220; State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 247 P2d 269; State 
v. Jacobs, 397 P2d 463; State, ex rel Road Commission v. Wood, 452 
P2d 872; Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P2d 
862; Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P2d 1370. 
We invite the Court's attention to the case of Moyle v. 
Salt Lake City, 176 P2d 882, where it is stated: 
"It is elemental in eminent domain cases, that the owner is 
entitled to the value of the property for the highest and 
best use to which it could be put at the time of the 
taking, and is not limited to the use then actually made of 
it." 
In the case of State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of the 
Church, supra, our Supreme Court, citing the provision of 104-61-12 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, stated: 
"'For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages the 
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date 
of the service of summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property 
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to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property 
not actually taken, but injuriously affected, * * *' 
(Emphasis ours.)" (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Jacobs, supra, the Court stated: 
"The owner of the property under condemnation is entitled 
to a value based upon the highest and best use to which it 
could be put at the time of the taking, without limitation 
as to the use then actually made of it." 
In Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui, supra, our Supreme Court again 
held as follows: 
"The trial court's ruling was consistent with that purpose 
and with the general rule; That the value of condemned 
property is to be determined as of the date and under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the taking; * * *" 
One of the major problems we have with the Court's ruling 
stems from that portion of the Opinion of this Court set forth on 
Page 14, which states: 
"The time of the taking is generally considered to be the 
time at which the condemning authority actually takes 
possession of the property, not the time at which the 
initial complaint is served." (Citing the case of Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 468 P2d at 99.) 
We respectfully submit that reliance upon Phillips for the 
above position is misplaced. A careful reading of the Phillips 
case clearly states that the date for determination of compensation 
is the date of taking. Nowhere in the Phillips case do we find 
the language suggested by this Court in its Opinion hereinabove 
quoted. 
As we read the Phillips case, it is not inconsistent with 
the Utah law and an analysis of the facts in said case discloses 
that the parties agreed that the date of "taking" was March 9, 
1966, id. at 97, and not the date of possession by the condemning 
authority which occurred subsequent to the March 9, 1966, date. 
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In Phillips, much as in the instant case, possession of the 
property did not change until subsequent to the taking date, as the 
tenant continued in possession from March 9, 1966, until April 25, 
1966, id, at 101. It is also clear that the tenants in the 
Phillips case continued to pay rent to the original property owner 
through September of 1966, Id, at 101, Thus, under any doctrine 
established in Phillips, the date of taking is not the date of 
possession by the condemning agency as held by this Court in its 
Opinion dated October 11, 1989. Given this analysis, we 
respectfully submit that the Court has erred in its interpretation 
of the Phillips case and the applicable law. 
In the Opinion rendered by this Court, it is not stated 
that it is the intention of the Court to overrule or modify 
pre-existing law or place a different interpretation upon the 
statutory provision of 78-34-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. The law seems so well settled on this issue that we 
respectfully submit that the Kansas case of Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Bradley is not controlling, and does not reverse or override the 
rule of law announced by our Supreme Court. 
If the rights of the tenant in this action became fixed as 
of the date of "taking" (issuance of summons) as we believe the law 
to be, then, and in that event, whatever value the existing 
leasehold interests had were fixed as of that date. 
The tenants, under the cases and authorities cited, were 
entitled to file their responsive pleadings to the complaint in 
condemnation, and further, as a matter of law and of constitutional 
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right, were entitled to have their respective property interests 
appraised and demonstrate whether or not a "bonus factor" existed 
with reference to their respective leasehold interests without 
being in violation of any provision of their respective lease 
agreements. The tenants should be entitled to submit to the fact 
finder a complete and total analysis of the value ascribed by 
expert appraisers to the existing leasehold interests, including 
the option to renew provision contained therein. 
Of particular import, we wish to invite the Court's 
attention to the case decided by the United States Supreme Court, 
which we believe to be directly in point with one of the critical 
issues here involved. In the case of Almota Farmers Elevator & 
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 35 L.Ed 2d 1, 93 S. 
Ct 791, the government had instituted proceedings to condemn a 
leasehold interest which at the time of the commencement of the 
action had a seven and one-half year period remaining and 
contained an option to renew the lease for an additional term. At 
the time of the taking, the property had improvements placed 
thereon by the tenant. The tenant contended that in determining 
the value of its leasehold interest, they were entitled to include 
a consideration of the possible renewal of the lease. The Federal 
District Court accepted the lessees contention and on appeal to the 
9th Circuit Court, the ruling of the District Court was reversed. 
The United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari and 
reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, and in so doing, held that 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the 
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lessee was entitled to have all of the improvements assessed at 
their value over their useful life without regard to the term of 
the leasef taking into account the possibility that the lease might 
be renewed as well as the possibility that it might notf and that 
it was improper to limit compensation to the use of the 
improvements only over the remaining lease term, since such 
limitation failed to award what a willing buyer would have paid for 
the lease with the improvements in view of the possibility of 
renewal. 
In the instant case, the tenants had made improvements upon 
the subject property which were to be compensated for in the 
process of the condemnation. However, the trial court concluded 
that the value of the improvements would be the total extent of any 
compensation which the tenants would be entitled to share in. 
Thus, the trial court diminished the total leasehold interest and 
property right taken by the power of eminent domain. 
On the date of service of summons, the leasehold agreements 
then in existence had approximately 13 months of unexpired term, 
plus an option to renew with no indication as to if, as, or when an 
order of occupancy would be granted. At that point in time, there 
occurred a taking within the constitutional sense, and the tenants 
were entitled, and were entirely warranted, in asserting their 
claim to damage without the threat or expectancy that they would be 
penalized for so doing by the assessment of attorney's fees against 
them. 
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At the time of the filing of the answer bv these 
Defendants/Appellants, material issues of fact existed relative to 
the damages, if any, which said tenants were entitled to receive, 
and consequently, the filing of the answer was not unwarranted but 
required to avoid a default iudgment being entered against them. 
POINT II 
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF OWNERS 
IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The only basis for the granting of attornev's fees is if 
the tenants were unwarranted in asserting their claims to share in 
any damage award, and only then, if there exists a contractual 
basis for such. 
Based upon the record, there can be no disoute that: 
A) On the date of taking, the leasehold interests were in 
effect, and; 
B) Each leasehold interest had a remaininq period of time? 
and, 
C) Each leasehold interest contained an option to renew. 
The authorities cited under Point I clearlv support the 
rights of the tenants to file a responsive pleading without 
violating any provision of their lease. 
The rights of the parties being "fixed" as of the date of 
taking, a full and complete evidentiary trial should have been 
accorded tenants to present evidence as to the fair market value 
of the existing leasehold interests. See: Almota Farmers Elevator 
& Warehouse Co. v. United States, supra. 
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The proceedings conducted by the owners in contesting the 
rights of the tenants were not only contrary to the contractual 
rights of the parties, but were totally unwarranted and 
unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the authorities cited clearly 
support the tenants1 position that on the date of service of 
summons, they were in possession of a compensable interest in the 
property condemned and entitled to assert their claim for damages 
as may be determined upon a full evidentiary hearing. 
To assess attorney's fees against the tenants for filing a 
responsive pleading to the Complaint is without support in law or 
in fact and penalizes said parties for exercising a legal right. 
We believe the law recognizes the right of any owner of real 
property to challenge the amount of just compensation to be awarded 
in any condemnation proceeding and find no basis for the assessment 
of attorney's fees against the owner of an interest in real 
property should he fail to convince the triers of fact that the 
damages sustained do not exceed the sum offered by or alleged to be 
"just compensation" by the condemning authority. To hold that the 
tenants are liable to the owners for their attorney's fees in 
contesting the right of the tenants to share in the award would be 
no different than assessing attorney's fees against the owners and 
in favor of the condemning authority should they fail to prevail in 
their challenge of the amount to be awarded by the condemning 
authority. 
-10-
If the filing of the condemnation action did not terminate 
the tenants1 rights to assert their claim to share in the award, 
then there exists no basis for the assessment of attorney's fees 
against the tenants and in favor of the owners. 
We respectfully urge the Court to reconsider the issues 
involved herein and apply what we believe to be the correct rule 
of law: i.e., on the date of taking the tenants were the owners of 
a compensable property right which had been taken by the filing of 
the action and service of summons and that it was not improper for 
the tenants to pursue their constitutional and legal rights to seek 
a determination of the nature and extent of the compensable 
interest, if any, by the triers of fact. 
DATED this / day of November^l989. 
Lx&Pfift B.' WALL 
Aj^ tforney for Defendants/Appellants 
Daskalas and Pentelakis 
:. MO^NEY, i: 
JL 
JEROME H. 0 III 
Attorney for Defendant^Appellants 
Daskalas and Pentelakis 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
p This is to certify that # true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following named persons this 7^la. day of November, 1989: 
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